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THINKING PROPERTY AT ROME
ALAN WATSON*
It is a commonplace among writers on slavery that there is an inher-
ent contradiction or a necessary confusion in regarding slaves as both
human beings and things. In law there is no such contradiction or confu-
sion. Slaves are both property and human beings. Their humanity is not
denied but (in general) they are refused legal personality, a very different
matter.
Things as property may be classed in various ways, and the classifi-
cation may then have an impact on owners' rights and duties. A thing
may be corporeal or incorporeal, immoveable or moveable. Some move-
ables may be classed as res se moventes, things that move of their own
accord, animate beings, such as horses and cattle; others, again, as inani-
mate property. A sub-division of res se moventes might be in Aristotle's
term-"thinking property,"' that is, human beings. And the ownership
of thinking property may in the eyes of the law create rights and duties
that are somewhat different from those arising from the ownership of
other res se moventes.
This Paper is devoted to an examination of some problems that oc-
cur when slaves are considered as "thinking property." I will not deal
with the rather different issues that arise when slaves are to some extent
accorded legal personality, such as when they may appear as witnesses,
create a legally valid marriage, or be prosecuted for crime. The subject,
therefore, concerns issues such as whether a person is liable for injuries
caused by the negligence of a fellow worker to a slave whom he had
hired,2 and whether a hirer of a slave is liable if he permitted the slave to
do work forbidden by the contract, and the slave was injured. 3
* Ernest P. Rogers Professor of Law, University of Georgia; M.A., LL.B (Glas.); M.A., D.
Phil., D.C.L. (Oxon); LL.D. (Edin.); LL.D. honoris causa (Glas.).
I am grateful to John L. Barton for his helpful criticisms. Many of the issues in this Paper
concern the contract of mandate which was the subject of my D. Phil. thesis. While writing that, I
also received much aid and advice from John. For that and for many years of friendship, I wish to
dedicate this paper to him. I also must thank Paul Finkelman for much advice.
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1.4-6.
2. See, e.g., for the United States: Farwell v. Boston and Worcester Railroad Corp., 45 Mass.
(4 Met.) 49 (1842); Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Co., 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 245 (1858).
Cf. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 45-50 (1981); Alan Watson, Slave Law:
History & Ideology, 91 YALE L.J. 1034, 1037-40 (1982) [hereinafter Review] (reviewing Tushnet).
3. See, e.g., for the United States: Gorman v. Campbell, 14 Ga. 137 (1853). Cf. TUSHNET,
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This Paper is restricted to Rome because it was there that the law of
thinking property was most developed. I will deal with only five exam-
ples, chosen because I have not examined them before, and because I
think I have something new to say.
4
I. A SLAVE GIVES A MANDATE TO Buy HIMSELF
A first issue will be selected from mandate, which was the contract
that came into being when one person asked another to do something for
him gratuitously, and the latter agreed.' When a slave made a contract,
all the rights under it accrued to his owner. In early law no liability
attached to the owner, and the slave, not having legal personality, could
not be sued. By the last century of the republic, a slave's contract could
make his owner liable in some cases to some extent. Most commonly,
the owner's liability was restricted to the amount of the slave's pecu-
lium-a fund that belonged to the owner but which he allowed the slave
to use as if it were his own-and the extent to which the owner had
benefitted.
If my slave gave a mandate for the purchase of himself so that he
might be redeemed, Pomponius elegantly discusses whether he who
redeemed the slave can sue the seller to take the slave back, since the
action on mandate is reciprocal. But Pomponius says it would be most
unfair that I should be forced, through his own act, to take back my
slave whom I wanted to alienate in perpetuity; nor should I in this case
be more liable on mandate than that I sell him to you.
6
Ulpian was a jurist and imperial bureaucrat who was murdered in 223
A.D.; Pomponius was a jurist active in the mid-second century. The text
is not quite in proper form. "He who redeemed the slave" (is, qui servum
redemerit) must mean "he who bought the slave to redeem him" because
the slave has obviously not been redeemed. Otherwise, since he would
now be free, he could not be returned as a slave to his former owner. If
Aulus is the first owner of the slave, and Balbus is the purchaser, then
supra note 2, at 50-54; Watson, Review, supra note 2, at 1040-42; Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow
Servant" Ideology, Law and Industrialization, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 269-305 (1987).
4. Thus, of necessity, I will not deal with any text from the republic or any of the standard
cases, since these are covered by my five volumes: ALAN WATSON, THE LAW IN THE LATER Ro-
MAN REPUBLIC (1965-1974); ALAN WATSON, THE CONTRACT OF MANDATE IN ROMAN LAW
(1961) [hereinafter MANDATE]; ALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW (1987) [hereinafter ROMAN
SLAVE LAW].
5. See generally, VINCENZO ARANGIO-RUIZ, IL MANDATO IN DIRITrO ROMANO (1949);
WATSON, MANDATE, supra note 4.
6. DIG. 17.1.19 (Ulpian, Ad Sabinum 43). The Digest of Justinian was part of the codification
of Roman law issued by the Byzantine emperor, Justinian I, with the force of statute, and which
much later came to be called the Corpus Juris Civilis. The Digest, published in 533, is a huge collec-
tion of excerpts from writings of jurists who lived between the first and mid-third centuries A.D.
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there are two contracts between Aulus and Balbus. First, there is a man-
date from Aulus to Balbus to buy the slave, let us call him Pamphilus,
with subsequent redemption. In mandate the "principal" has to indem-
nify the "agent" for any loss he suffers, and the "agent" is liable for fraud
but usually not for negligence. Second, there is a contract of sale for the
slave, Aulus being the seller, Balbus the purchaser.
The slave has been delivered to Balbus, but Balbus has repented of
his agreement. He no longer wants to free the slave, but to return him to
Aulus. Balbus seems not to have an action on the contract of sale which
is perfectly valid and seems irreproachable, but what about mandate
since the action is reciprocal? Balbus should not suffer loss from execut-
ing Aulus' mandate, so can he recoup by returning the slave and getting
back the purchase price?
7
If Aulus personally, not the slave, had given Balbus a mandate to
buy the slave and then free him,8 and Balbus bought but did not free
Pamphilus, Aulus would have an action on mandate against Balbus to
the extent of his interest. Balbus should go through with the mandate,
but would be entitled to reimbursement from Aulus. But in actuality, the
initiative was the slave's and the mandate was by the slave. We are not
even told whether Aulus knew of the mandate. To what extent, the
problem is, has the slave, Pamphilus, made his owner, Aulus, liable?
There is no reasonable, principled, answer in the absence of fraud
and the issue of fraud is not raised. Balbus should, perhaps, go through
with freeing the slave, and then sue Aulus on the mandate up to the level
of the slave's peculium.9 But Balbus is unwilling to do so, possibly be-
cause there are insufficient funds in the peculium. And Aulus obviously
has no burning desire that the slave be freed, and is not pressing Balbus
to fulfil the mandate. The desire that the mandate be carried out is that
of the slave. Balbus is in a difficult legal position. A mandatary may
withdraw from the contract so long as nothing has been done on it, but
thereafter he is liable to the mandator if he does not go through with it.
Balbus has wilfully left the mandate incomplete, so he has no real title to
sue Aulus.
Pomponius' solution is simply to hold that in the circumstances Au-
lus' liability to Balbus on mandate was restricted to selling the slave,
Pamphilus, to Balbus. That is to say, the mandate was valid but Balbus,
7. Any action on mandate to Balbus would in fact be for recompense in money, not to compel
Aulus to take back the slave.
8. Perhaps, for some reason, it would have been more appropriate for Balbus to be the ex-
slave's patron.
9. On the sale of a slave the peculium remained with the seller, unless otherwise agreed.
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the mandatory, has no action against Aulus. Ulpian describes
Pomponius' discussion as elegant. So, in the event, is his solution.' 0 It
would, indeed, have been unjust that a mandate between the slave and
Balbus, primarily and obviously in the interest of the slave, would have
put the burden on Aulus when Balbus was unwilling to complete the
mandate. Pomponius, it should be stressed, claimed "it would be most
unfair...": a policy argument. Policy arguments are very uncommon in
Roman law; but here no solution could otherwise be found."
A different approach to the problem or a related one was taken by
the most famous of the Roman jurists, Papinian, who was executed in
212 A.D.:
When a slave gives a mandate to a third party to buy him, the mandate
is void. But if the mandate was to this end that the slave be manumit-
ted, and the purchaser did not manumit him, the owner will both re-
cover the price as seller, and also there will be an action on mandate on
account of affection: suppose the son was his natural son or brother
(for the jurists have agreed that in actions on good faith account is to
be taken of affection). But if the buyer gave the price from his own
money (nor can he otherwise be released by the action on sale), the
question is frequently asked whether he can validly bring an action on
account of the peculium. And it seems more correct and expedient to
hold that the praetor had not contemplated contracts of this kind by
which slaves might take themselves away from their owners by bad
cause. 12
Again Papinian is considering the situation where the slave took the initi-
ative in giving a mandate to Balbus. A simple mandate by Pamphilus to
Balbus to buy him is, he says, void. This would not, of itself, affect the
validity of the subsequent purchase. If the slave's mandate to Balbus was
both that Balbus buy him and manumit him, and Balbus buys but does
not free the slave, then Papinian holds both that the contract of sale is
valid and Aulus has an action for the price, and also that the mandate is
valid and Aulus will have an action on it. The mandator's action lies for
his interest in having the mandate carried out.' 3 Hence, since he has
recovered the money due to him by the actio venditi, the action on sale,
we are expressly told that the actio mandati will lie on account of affec-
tion. (Incidentally the text shows that in an action of good faith, the
award which will always be in money may be for more than the plain-
tiff's financial loss.)
10. It is noticeable that he does not say that the mandate to Balbus was only to buy the slave,
but that Aulus' liability on mandate was only to sell the slave.
11. See ALAN WATSON, THE STATE, LAW AND RELIGION: PAGAN ROME 64-69 (1992).
12. DIG. 17.1.54.pr. (Papinium, Questionum 27).
13. See, e.g., WATSON, MANDATE, supra note 4, at 111-24.
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Papinian next turns his attention to the issue of a remedy to Balbus
to the extent of the slave's peculium. This action cannot relate to the
contract of sale since that was properly carried out. Thus, the mandate
must have been performed by Balbus. Hence, presumably the slave was
manumitted by Balbus, and the question is whether Balbus can bring the
action on mandate against Aulus for his expenditure in fulfilling the
mandate (the purchase price), restricted to the amount of the peculium.
So this is not now the situation discussed by Pomponius. Papinian's so-
lution is crude but effective. Balbus has no actio mandati because the
praetorian remedies designed to give some protection to third parties
contracting with slaves were not envisaged for cases where a slave was
wrongfully removing himself from his owner.1 4 There is no principle
here: in other situations where a slave acted wrongfully in making a con-
tract the owner could be liable up to the amount of the peculium.
If we consider together the opinions of Pomponius and Papinian,
whether or not we think their views are consistent with one another, the
following picture emerges.
For Papinian, a slave's mandate to a third party simply to buy him
is null. This is reasonable as a result, because either party can freely
withdraw from the mandate until there is some performance or reliance
on it. 15 Performance is in fact the making of the contract of sale, and
thereafter all issues between the parties can be resolved by rights under
that contract. There is no need to discuss particular issues such as
whether a slave can legally bind his owner by such a mandate. But the
slave's mandate might be more extensive: that Balbus buy him, and then
free him. For Pomponius, if Balbus bought and did not free, there was a
valid mandate. Aulus was liable to Balbus on mandate, but in the ab-
sence of complete performance by Balbus, Aulus' liability was restricted
to the sale. The result seems equitable, but no legal principle is discover-
14. The praetors were among the highest of the elected Roman officers of state, and among
their duties was control of the main courts. At the beginning of his year of office, a praetor issued an
Edict setting out the types of actions he would allow. Technically, this was not legislation, but in
practice, the Edict was a most powerful source of law. The praetor (as here) could grant new ac-
tions, or change the scope of existing remedies. Praetors took over most of the Edict of their
predecessors.
15. A more complex and principled explanation is provided by a rescript:
If a slave gave an outsider a mandate to buy himself, an action is thought to exist although
neither from the person of the slave (because a free person could not give this mandate) nor
from the person of the owner (since whoever gives a mandate that something be bought
from him gives a mandate in vain), and this for the very best reason because the point is not
that the action arises from the mandate itself, but that on account of the mandate the
action arises on a different contract. It is settled that an action is acquired for the owner.
CODE J. 4.36.1.pr. (Diocletian & Maximian 293). The remainder of the rescript seems rather con-
fused but the action in question seems to arise from the subsequent sale.
The Code is that part of Justinian's codification that contained the rulings of the emperors.
1993]
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able for the precise extent of liability on mandate. On similar facts
Papinian discussed only Balbus' liability to Aulus. Aulus had both the
action on the sale for payment of the price and the action on mandate for
any further interest in performance of the mandate, based on a personal
affection for the slave. This would seem to be in accord with standard
legal principles. Where Balbus both bought and freed the slave, Papinian
held that the mandate was valid, but would refuse Balbus an action on
that contract against Aulus because that was not the kind of slave's con-
tract that praetors had envisaged would make an owner liable to third
parties. This is again a policy argument, such as, I have said, is found
very rarely in Roman law, but no principle seems to exist that could
determine the issue. I tend to believe, though cannot prove, that the pol-
icy argument appears simply because there was no principle.
II. A SLAVE'S CONTRACT FOR HIS PRISONER-OF-WAR OWNER
A second issue concerns a contract of stipulation taken by a slave
from a third party. The stipulatio was a formal, unilateral, verbal con-
tract of strict law where one party asked the other if he promised to give
or do something, and the other immediately responded, necessarily using
the same verb. The promisor was very much bound by the wording of
the stipulation; and it was a basic rule that one could not make a stipula-
tion on behalf of another, except on behalf of the person in whose power
one was. 16 Since neither a person in power nor a slave could acquire
anything, a stipulatio taken by a son or daughter in power or a slave
immediately accrued in normal circumstances to the paterfamilias or the
owner. But there could be problems, for example if a slave had two own-
ers, or if he were the object of a usufruct. 17 Thus:
A slave whose owner had been captured by the enemy stipulated for
something to be given to the owner. Although whatever he had simply
stipulated for or received from another would belong to the heir of the
prisoner and the law is otherwise in the case of a son [of a prisoner-of-
war] since he was neither in power at the time he took the stipulation
16. See, e.g., W.W. BUCKLAND, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 439 (3d ed. 1963).
At Rome, a person was in paternal power so long as his or her father, or more remote paternal
ancestor, was alive unless he or she had been formally released from power. Only persons, male or
female, free from paternal power could own property. Hence, when a person in paternal power
made a contract, all the rights and benefits under it went to the father.
17. See, e.g., DIG. 41.1.37.4-6 (Julian, Digestorum 44); 41.1.43.pr., 2 (Gauis, Ad Edictum
Proviciale 7); 41.1.45 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale 7). For issues that could arise from owner-
ship of a common slave see, e.g., MARIO BRETONE, SERVUS COMMUNIS (1958). Perhaps my favorite
example is in DIG. 45.3.9.1: a slave owned in common by Titius and Maevius took a stipulation "for
Titius or Maevius." Cassius who is followed by Julian, and approved by Ulpian, held that the stipu-
lation was ineffective. The slave cannot be creditor; and, since it does not appear whether Titius or
Maevius is the creditor, neither can sue.
[Vol. 68:1355
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nor would he later (like the slave) be included in the inheritance,18 yet
in the present case the question may be raised whether the heir ac-
quired nothing from this stipulation, just as where a slave forming part
of the inheritance stipulated on behalf of the deceased or of the future
heir. But in this case the slave will be equated with the son. For even
if a son of a captive took a stipulation for his father, the matter will be
in suspense, and if the father died among the enemy, the stipulation
will be seen to be without effect, because he stipulated for another, not
for himself. 19
A Roman who was captured by the enemy immediately lost his citizen-
ship and, indeed, was regarded as a slave of the enemy. If he died in
captivity, then for succession purposes-only for succession purposes-
he was regarded as having died at the moment of captivity so that (never
having lost his citizenship) his succession would open up in the usual
way. If he returned from the enemy in an honorable way, then he re-
turned with postliminium. Postliminium is perhaps the subtlest part of
Roman legal science. The former prisoner's rights were treated in differ-
ent ways: thus, marriage (with two exceptions) was dissolved by capture
and did not revive by postliminium;20 guardianship (tutela) that he exer-
cised was ended by captivity, revived by postliminium, but not retroac-
tively; patria potestas, obligations and property rights were suspended by
captivity but if the captive returned with postliminium they were revived
as if he had never been a prisoner.
2'
The main issues in our text concern a stipulatio taken by a slave
whose owner (Aulus, again) has been captured by the enemy. If the
wording was: "Do you promise to give to me?" "I promise," then there
was no real problem. The slave acquires the rights for his owner even if
who the owner is cannot be determined at the moment. Thus, if Aulus
returned with postliminium his property rights revived retroactively, and
Aulus was entitled under his slave's stipulatio. If Aulus died in captivity,
he was regarded for succession purposes as dead from the moment of
capture, hence at the time of the stipulatio the slave belonged to the in-
heritance, and the rights under the stipulatio went to the heir when one
was recognized.
22
The problem arises when the wording was "Do you promise to give
18. A slave, being property, would on his owner's death be part of the inheritance. In contrast,
a son would on the death of his father become free from paternal power (unless there was a more
remote male ancestor) and, indeed, would usually be one of the heirs.
19. DIG. 45.3.18.2 (Papinian, Quaestionum 27).
20. See ALAN WATSON, STUDIES IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 37-53 (1991).
21. See generally LUIGI AMIRANTE, CAPTIVITAS E POSTLIMINIUM (1950).
22. We need not go into details but it should be noted that, except for slaves of the deceased or
persons who became free of paternal power on that death, Romans did not become heirs either on
intestacy or under a will until they accepted the inheritance.
19931
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to Aulus?" "I promise." If Aulus returned with postliminium, then his
property and contractual rights revived retroactively, and the stipulatio
was validly in his favor. But what if he had died in captivity? Then in at
least one sense the slave had made the stipulation for an outsider-in-
deed, a non-person-in whose power he was not. But ought the heir be
allowed to have right under the contract?
To help with the problem Papinian had recourse to the effect of a
stipulation made by afiliusfamilias, a son-in-power. Where the stipula-
tio is framed in the simple form (simpliciter) by the son, the result is not
the same because, we are told "he was neither in power at the time he
took the stipulation nor would he later (like the slave) be included in the
inheritance." This does not give a direct answer to the fate of the stipula-
tion, and there is something not quite right with the first alternative. 23
As the text makes plain further down, and as is confirmed by other texts,
the effect of the stipulation is in suspense: if the father returns with post-
liminium, the stipulation is valid in his favor.24 Hence patria potestas
must, for Papinian, have been restored retroactively. Where the father
did not return, then since the son could not be regarded as part of the
inheritance the stipulation would be valid for the benefit of the son.
But the real issue arises when the stipulation was taken "for Aulus."
Until the mortal fate of Aulus is sealed the matter is in suspense. When
the promisee was the son and the father returned with postliminium, then
the stipulation is valid and accrues to Aulus; if the father died in captiv-
ity, the stipulation was for a third party and is void. Papinian adds-
actually very lamely-that here a slave can be equiparated to the son.
Accordingly, if Aulus does not return, his inheritance does not acquire
right to the stipulation, because when the stipulation was made, it was
made for the benefit of a third person and so is void. Papinian does not
further disclose his reasoning to that decision.
The text seems rather confused, but the author's thought process
can be recovered. The question at issue is the status of a stipulation by a
slave made expressly in the name of his owner when the owner has be-
come a prisoner-of-war. The difficult case is where the owner dies in
captivity. Papinian has no answer that can be reached by straightfor-
ward legal principle. So he takes two standard approaches together. By
one, he proceeds from the simpler case--the stipulation simpliciter-to
23. Indeed, interpolations are suspected in the text: cf. AMIRANTE, supra note 21, at 93. As the
remainder of this section of this paper will show, I treat the text as genuine. But the suggested
interpolations do not affect the basic argument.
24. See, e.g., DIG. 45.1.11 (Paul, Ad Sabinum 2); 46.4.11.3 (Paul, Ad Sabinum 12); G. Inst.
1.129. The Institutes of Gaius are an elementary students' textbook, written around 161 A.D.
[Vol. 68:1355
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the one that concerns him. By the other he tries the approach by anal-
ogy: in many, though not all, ways, a master's rights from a slave's
transaction are the same as a father-of-a-family's rights from a son's
transaction.
But in this instance neither of these two approaches turns out to be
fruitful. The simpler case provides no guidance for the difficult alterna-
tive in the more complex case. The analogy with the son also breaks
down in the simpler case: this time the result of the stipulatio would
differ according to whether it was made by a slave or son. So now
Papinian has a real dilemma: no help from the simpler case or by anal-
ogy. So he cuts the Gordian knot by an assertion: that the analogy does
work for the complex case even when the owner died a prisoner! But he
can produce no convincing argument for the approach.
The text is thus very revealing. Papinian was faced with a tricky
issue which he had real difficulty in resolving. He should, indeed, then
have cut out his discussion of the simpler case and the analogy with the
son, but they had been part of his mental workings, and they were re-
tained. He might have used a more direct approach for the difficult alter-
native, which would have been at least as persuasive and would have
given the same result. When Titius died in captivity his inheritance was
treated as passing at the moment of capture. Hence when the stipulation
was made "for Titius" at the time when he was a captive, it was,
Papinian might have argued, made after his death, and was not part of
the inheritance.
III. A SLAVE'S COMPROMISE WITH A VILLAIN
My third example of bargains made by "thinking property" relates
to transactio, compromise. Transactio was a compromise (that involved
no formalities) of a legal dispute, whether the action was pending, run-
ning its course, or even-if an appeal was possible-already decided. It
was the abandoning of a claim in return for something given or prom-
ised, or the abandoning of a particular defense in return for some other
concession. 2
5
If my slave who had free administration of his peculium made an
agreement not on account of a gift with a person who stole a thing
from the peculium, this seems a valid compromise. For although the
action on theft is procured (quaeratur) for the owner, nonetheless still
the matter concerns the slave's peculium. But even if the whole double
penalty of theft was paid to the slave there is no doubt the thief would
25. DIG. 2.15; CODE J.2.4. See also BUCKLAND, supra note 16, at 525; MAX KASER, DAS
R6MISCHE PRIVATRECHT 642 (2d ed. 1971).
1993]
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be released. It is in harmony (consequens est) with this that if it hap-
pened that the slave received from the thief what appears satisfactory
on that account, there seems to be a real compromise.
26
The limits of a slave's administration of hispeculium were precisely those
set by his owner, except that even if he were granted full powers of ad-
ministration (libera administratio) he could not make a valid gift.
2 7
The text concerns a very particular type of issue, and this accounts
for the emphasis in the text. Sed et si, "But even if," introduces a more
extreme case. Cui consequens est, "It is in harmony with this," then prof-
fers a decision that is now easy given the previous case. But why is pay-
ment to the slave of the full double damages for a theft a more difficult
case for the release of the thief's liability than a compromise made to the
slave?
The situation is this. Someone stole a thing from the peculium of a
slave (Pamphilus) whose owner (Aulus) had granted him free adminis-
tration of it. The private law action on theft (actio furti) for double the
value of what was stolen was in the air, was pending, otherwise a transac-
tio could not be involved. This action could be brought only by the
owner. Ulpian emphasizes that the action was procured, "was created
for," the owner. At this stage, Pamphilus makes a deal with the thief
(Gnaeus); a deal in which the slave does not intend to make a gift. The
issue is whether this is a valid transactio, because if it is, the result is that
Aulus' action is barred. Ulpian holds the transactio valid.
"But even if"-introducing the more extreme case-the slave had
received the full amount that the owner would have been awarded in the
actio furti the arrangement would have been valid. The point is that if
the actiofurti had gone to fruition the award would have gone directly to
Aulus, and would only fall into the peculium if Aulus so wished. Indeed,
the money would not form part of the peculium until it was actually
delivered to the slave by the owner.28 In contrast, where on account of
the theft the thief paid the double value-the amount that would have
been awarded if there had been an actio furti-to the slave, the money
would automatically be in the peculium. Since the full amount of the
claim was paid, a technical transactio is not involved. The arrangement
simply wipes out the owner's action automatically.
The slave's peculium is in the ownership of his owner. But it may
make a huge difference to the slave's owner, both in terms of law and of
26. DIG. 47.2.52.26 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 37).
27. DIG. 2.14.28.2 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale 1).
28. For the nature of the peculium, and acquisitions to it, see above all, W.W. BUCKLAND, THE
ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY 187-206 (1908).
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practical life, whether a sum of money is in the peculium of the slave or
not. In terms of law, between master and slave the owner can arbitrarily
strip the slave of all or part of the peculium. But the owner's position
with regard to outsiders is very different. He cannot arbitrarily withdraw
anything from thepeculium in a way that would deprive a creditor of any
recovery on the slave's contract or delict.29 Hence, if some other party
had an action against the owner because of a contract with the slave, he
might well receive much more if the money from the thief had gone into
the peculium than if it had not. In terms of practical life, the master
would be affected if, for example, he had agreed with the slave to free
him on payment of a fixed sum from the peculium. Such an agreement
would seem to be common-it would be good for the slave's morale and
encourage him to work harder, and the owner could use the money to
buy a replacement. 30 The agreement, of course, would have no legal ef-
fect, but most owners would not depart from it lightly or arbitrarily.
Such behavior would make not only that slave less tractable but the
others also. So in practical terms here, it is much better for the owner
that this money, not earned by the slave, not go into the peculium, but
that the slave earn more and so build up the peculium.
It is in this sense that an arrangement is more extreme where
Pamphilus receives all that might have been won in an actio furti than
where he made a compromise. It is also more extreme in the sense that
even where there is no technical compromise, transactio, but only a single
payment of what might have been recoverable in Aulus' action, Pamphi-
lus' behavior excludes the possibility of Aulus bringing a lawsuit.
For modern scholars with their interest in recovering the classical
law of Ulpian from any subsequent manipulation up to and including its
inclusion in the Byzantine Digest of Justinian there is more to the text.
The substance of the text is thought by some scholars to have been al-
tered. Above all, non donationis causa, "not on account of a gift," is said
to be suspect. 3t H.F. Jolowicz claims: "Only Byzantine subjectivism
could make the validity of a compromise depend on the slave's intention;
a classical lawyer would compare the amount received under the com-
promise with the value of the claim and decide accordingly whether there
29. We need not go into details, but for such remedies, the actio de peculio, actio tributoria, and
the vocatio in tributum see BUCKLAND, supra note 16, at 533-34.
30. See ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS 53-55 (1989); ALAN WATSON, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN ARCHAIC ROME: WAR AND RELIGION 67-68 (1993).
31. I agree that one would expect it to have appeared before, not after, cum eo. But apart from
doubts I might have about consistent elegance in Ulpian's style, a scribal slip cannot be excluded. It
is not easy, in my view, to explain why an interpolationist would misplace the phrase.
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was a gift or not."' 32
The argument seems quite misguided. First, there is no independent
evidence that Byzantine jurists were more interested in the subjective
state of a party's mind than were the Roman classical jurists. Second,
there are just too many situations-all of which could fruitfully have
been studied for this paper-where a slave's state of mind is considered
relevant, for one to think they are all the result of interpolation. 33 Third,
Ulpian is not stressing Pamphilus' state of mind. He is simply stating
only that a gift was not intended: if a gift was involved, the problem
would have been other. Fourth, the issue that interested Ulpian was
something quite different: could an act by a slave bar his owner's action
when the result was that anything obtained went into the peculium and
not, as would otherwise have been the case, directly to the owner? Fifth,
for a classical lawyer, as for most other lawyers, the validity of the com-
promise would not depend on the amount received compared with the
value of the claim, but on the reasonableness of the compromise. That
reasonableness could depend on the financial state of the thief, and the
chances of recovery. That in the circumstances the compromise is to be
regarded as reasonable is indicated by non donationis causa.
IV. A MANDATE TO A SLAVE TO PAY A DEBT TO HIS OWNER
A fourth example may again be chosen from the contract of
mandate:
[I]f I gave a mandate to your slave that he should pay on my behalf
what I owe you, Neratius writes that although the slave, having ob-
tained a loan entered it into your account books as received from me,
nonetheless if he did not take the money from the creditor expressly to
give it on my behalf, neither am I released nor can you bring the action
on mandate against me. But if he had borrowed expressly that he
would give on my behalf, in both cases the answer is the opposite. Nor
does it matter whether someone else or the same slave received in your
name what was paid on my behalf. And this is the more correct view
because as often as the creditor receives his own money the debtor is
not released.
34
Paul was a junior colleague of Papinian in the imperial service, and Nera-
tius was consul in 97 A.D. There are several situations discussed in the
text-though I will deal only with the first two. The unifying factor is
32. HERBERT F. JOLOWicz, DIGEST XLVII.2: DE FURTIS 79 n.26 (1940). See that note also
for other suggestions of interpolation.
33. See, e.g., DIG. 18.1.12 (Pomponius, Ad Quinturn Mucium 31); 41.1.37.4, 5, 6 (Julian,
Digestorum 44); 41.2.1.10, 19 (Paul, Ad Edictum 54).
34. DIG. 17.1.22.8 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32).
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the reason given in the last sentence: a debtor is not released when the
money received by the creditor for the debt is already the creditor's own.
It is important to note that although the mandatary, the agent, must
act for free there is no legal difficulty in accepting that a slave may bind
himself to act gratuitously under a mandate for another. He may thus
make his owner liable to an actio mandati (up to the limit of the
peculium).
The simplest situation is the second one: Marcus owes Aulus
money, and he gives Aulus' slave a mandate to pay his debt to Aulus.
The slave, Pamphilus, to fulfill the mandate, borrows the money from
Cornelius expressly in the name of Marcus. Since Cornelius delivers the
money to Pamphilus expressly on behalf of Marcus, Cornelius does not,
as otherwise would have been the case, make Aulus the owner on deliv-
ery. It is not Cornelius' intention to make Aulus owner of the money.
The slave delivers the money to Aulus and marks off in Aulus' account
books the payment of Marcus' debt. Paul holds that Marcus' debt is
extinguished and that Aulus has an action on mandate against Marcus.
The actio mandati lies for any loss falling to Aulus on account of the
mandate, that is to say, because of any liability to Cornelius on the loan.
The legal status of the loan is not simple. There is no legal relationship
between Marcus and Cornelius! When X gives a mandate to Y to buy
from Z, and Y acts, there is a contract of mandate between X and Y, and
a contract of sale between Y and Z, but no contract between X and Z
since in general Roman law did not recognize direct agency. 35 Nor in
this case can there be an action in rem of any kind to Cornelius against
Marcus. A third person generally cannot acquire ownership through de-
livery to himself for another person unless he is the general agent, procu-
rator, or in the power of that other.36 But as I said, the slave has not
acquired ownership of the money for his owner Aulus, since Cornelius
had no intention of giving to Aulus. Hence there is no contract of loan
for consumption, mutuum, between Aulus and Cornelius since that con-
tract required transfer of ownership to the borrower. 37 Rather, so long
as the actual coins received by the slave can be identified, Cornelius will
have the action claiming ownership, the vindicatio; thereafter Cornelius
will have the general remedy of the condictio against Aulus, claiming that
Aulus acquired something of which restitution ought to be made. Aulus'
actio mandati against Marcus is in respect to Aulus' liability to Cornelius
35. See, e.g., BUCKLAND, supra note 16, at 533-36; AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SONS, SLAVES
AND FREEDMAN IN ROMAN COMMERCE (1987).
36. See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 20, at 109-29.
37. See, e.g., BUCKLAND, supra note 16, at 468-69.
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under a vindicatio or condictio as a result of Marcus' mandate to Aulus'
slave.
The first situation in the text now becomes simpler. When Pamphi-
lus receives the money from Cornelius, without specifying that he is re-
ceiving it on behalf of Marcus, he receives ownership automatically for
his owner, Aulus. There is thus a mutuum between Cornelius and Au-
lus, and Aulus will be liable up to the limit of the slave's peculium. Even
though Pamphilus marks off in Aulus' account books that Marcus' debt
is paid, Marcus is not released, because in fact the debt has not been paid.
Since Pamphilus did not expressly receive the loan on behalf of Marcus,
he is not regarded as having acted on the mandate, hence his owner Au-
lus, cannot bring the actio mandati against Marcus.
V. A RUNAWAY SLAVE'S PURCHASE OF SLAVES
Mandate also provides us with a final example. The text in question,
which is the first one printed below, presents some very odd features.
My runaway slave, when he was in the hands of a thief, acquired
money, and procured slaves with it, and Titius received them by deliv-
ery38 from the seller. Mela says that by the action on mandate I would
obtain that Titius restore them to me because my slave seemed to have
given Titius a mandate to take by delivery, provided he had done this
at the request of the slave. But if the seller had delivered to Titius
without his request then I would bring the action on sale that the seller
deliver them to me, and the seller would recover from Titius by a con-
dictio, if he had delivered slaves to Titius which he did not owe, when
he thought he owed them.39
Mela was a jurist of the very early Empire. The first oddity is that on the
text as it stands the legal decision is quite straightforward, and the facts
seem unworthy of the seriousness of the treatment. A second oddity is
that we are given facts that are irrelevant to the decision, for Roman
juristic texts normally only give details that are in point for the caseA
0
Thus, on the facts stated, it is quite irrelevant for the decision that the
slave acquired the money after he ran away, and not before. Third, if the
slave bought the others and did not give the seller a mandate to deliver
them to Titius, it is strange that the seller did so deliver them under the
38. All the references in the text to acquisition of ownership by delivery, traditio, would in
Paul's original have referred to mancipatio, a formal ceremony which then was needed for the trans-
fer of slaves.
39. DIG. 17.1.22.9 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32). Roman actions always lay for money. It is short-
hand to write that the action was for the slaves.
40. See the discussion in my book, ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW (forthcoming
1993).
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impression that he was bound to deliver them to Titius. So many oddities
cry out for an explanation.
But first we should take the text at face value. We are not told
whether the money involved was part of the peculium, nor does it matter.
A slave who ran away forfeited any right to administer the peculium.41
Strangely, a runaway slave was regarded as still in the possession of his
owner,42 but even if that were not so, the important point is that the
acquisitions of a runaway slave (like those of other slaves in most circum-
stances) became the property of his owner. Certainly when the slave was
in the hands of a thief-even someone who subsequently took the slave-
this was the case. The money used to buy the slaves was the money of
the runaway slave's owner. If Titius received the slaves from the seller at
the request of the runaway, Pamphilus, he would be acting on Pamphi-
lus' mandate. A contract of mandate would thus exist between Titius
and the slave's owner, Aulus. If delivery had been made in proper form
with the required ceremony of mancipatio, Titius would have become
owner. The reference in the second alternative to a condictio shows that
in the situation envisaged, Titius had become owner of the slaves, be-
cause the seller had clearly ceased to be such. Where the slaves were
delivered to Titius without Pamphilus' approval, no contract of mandate
existed between Titius and the runaway's owner, Aulus, but the latter
could have recourse to the contract of sale made by Pamphilus and the
seller, on account of the failure to deliver the slaves. That seller, in his
turn, can bring a condictio against Titius for indebiti solutio, the payment
of a debt that was not owed.
There is nothing difficult or surprising or particularly subtle in all
this, as a glance at two other texts will show:
If a runaway slave lent you money, the question is raised whether the
owner has a condictio against you. And, indeed, if my slave who had
been granted administration of his peculium lent to you, there will be a
mutuum. But a runaway or another slave, lending against the wishes
of his owner, by lending does not make the recipient owner. What
therefore is the position? A vindicatio can be brought for the coins if
they still exist; or if they have ceased to be possessed because of fraud
an actio ad exhibendum (action for production) is available. But if you
have used them up without fraud I will be able to sue you by
condictio.4
3
In ignorance and good faith I bought your slave from a thief. He, with
his peculium which belonged to you, acquired a man who was deliv-
41. See, e.g., DIG. 12.1.11.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 26).
42. See, e.g., BUCKLAND, supra note 28, at 269-70.
43. DIG. 12.1.11.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 26).
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ered" to me. Sabinus and Cassius think you can bring a condictio
against me for the man, but if I were out of pocket for the transaction
your slave has made, I have in turn an action against you. This is
correct...45
Sabinus and Cassius were jurists of the early Empire.
Thus, to return to Digest 7.1.22.9.46 The rulings and discussion are
banal if we take the text as it stands. After examination the unnecessary
details and oddities appear still odder. But an explanation is perhaps at
hand: in the transmission of the text a detail has possibly been lost. I
should like to suggest that Titius is the person with whom the runaway
slave has been living.
Such a suggestion would explain why the seller, without a mandate
from the runaway, delivered the slaves to Titius, thinking he was bound
to do so: he thought, mistakenly, that Titius was the runaway's owner.
This would also explain why we are told that the runaway was in the
hands of a thief: that is the relationship between the runaway and Ti-
tius. 4 7 It then also becomes interesting, if eventually not legally relevant,
that the runaway acquired the money in question when he was in Titius'
hands.
So the legal issues become what are Aulus' legal rights when his
runaway slave, Pamphilus, in the hands of Titius buys slaves with money
that he acquired when he was with Titius, and the seller delivered the
slaves to Titius?
The short answer is that Aulus' rights under any contracts made by
his slave, even with Titius, are unaffected by the fact that Titius is re-
garded as the thief of Pamphilus. Thus, if the bought slaves were deliv-
ered to Titius at the request of Pamphilus, a contract of mandate exists
between Aulus and Titius, and he can bring the actio mandati against
Titius on account of the delivered slaves. It is perhaps because in the end
Aulus' contractual rights are unaffected by the situation in theft between
Titius and Aulus that Titius' position as thief has fallen from the text.
That the issue of rights between the thief of a slave and his owner
44. Again, references in the text to traditio would originally have concerned mancipatio.
45. DIG. 12.1.31.1 (Paul, Ad Plantium 17).
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
47. The position of Titius is not that of an American abolitionist. Rogues would help slaves to
run away, taking with them valuables of the owner. The bargain was that the rogues, in return for
payment to them by the slaves of their owners' valuables, would secure freedom for the slaves. The
machinations and the law were complicated, with law usually trying to catch up with the villains'
latest ingenuity. The classic discussion is DAVID DAUBE, Slave Catching, in COLLECTED STUDIES
IN ROMAN LAW 1, 501-13 (1991). A slave who ran away committed theft of himself (though he
could not be sued by his owner), and anyone who helped him became an accomplice, liable in full to
the standard action on theft, actiofurti.
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was of interest to the jurists is well illustrated by the Digest: It is settled
that, when a stolen slave steals from the thief, the thief will have on that
account an action against the owner so that wrongful deeds of such
slaves not only do not go unpunished but also are not a source of profits
to the owners. 48 Celsus was active at the beginning of the second century
A.D. Buckland's observation on this text is well-known and accepta-
ble.49 His claim was that this is "a grotesque case, but correct in princi-
ple." 50 Likewise it is grotesque but correct in principle that a runaway
slave in the hands of a thief can put the thief under an obligation to his
owner on mandate, the contract founded on "duty and friendship." 51
In conclusion it should be noted that there was very little Roman
law that was specific to slavery. In some areas a slave was treated as a
human being; in these his legal position was very much akin to that of a
son in paternal power. In others he was treated as property; in these his
legal position was not much different from that of cattle.52 Yet, still, as
'thinking property,' slaves in some areas caused the law to be very com-
plex. This complexity was avoided in English-speaking America.
48. DIG. 47.2.68.4 (Celsus Digestorum 12).
49. See, e.g., JOLOWICZ, supra note 32, at 106 n.4; WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW, supra note
4, at 59.
50. BUCKLAND, supra note 16, at 581.
51. DIG. 17.1.1.4 (Paul, Ad Edictum 32).
52. See ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW 39-41 (1991).

